Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1965

Flora Paull v. Zions First National Bank, Pamela B.
Snow, Phyllis R. Snow and Melva B. Snow,
Administrators of the Estate of Burke M. Snow,
Deceased : Respondent's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.R.M. Child; Attorney for Respondent
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Paull v. Zions Bank, No. 10412 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3700

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

vs.
~-.. S FIRST

NATIONAL BANK,

B. SNOW, PHYLLIS R.
ill!MW and MELVA B. SNOW, Ad_.liltrators of the Estate of BUBK.B
;rA.1aa:u.1~

SHOW, deceased,

De/ndantaaftdR~fl

RESPONDENTS'

_ i···

BIU~
....
!Jl'

.• .

TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ----------------------------------------

1

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT ----------------------------

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ------------------------------------

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------------------

2

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE MATTER OF
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE ________________

10

10

POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DR.
BURKE SNOW WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW __________________ 12
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTION CONCERNING CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE _____ ----------------------------

13

POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING OF COUNSEL IN THE PRESENCE
OF THE JURY AS TO COUNSEL'S OBJECTIONS TO ALLOWING THE DEPOSITION OF DR. SNOW TO BE TAKEN INTO
THE JURY ROOM ------------------------------------------- 14
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING OF THE JURY CONCERNING THEIR
PERSONAL FEELINGS WITH RESPECT
TO CONTINUED DELIBERATIONS ____________ 15

POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE JURY TO CONTINUE DELIBERATIONS AFTER AN EXPRESSION
FROM THEM, "THEY WERE DEADLOCKED.'' -------------------------------------------16
CONCLUSION ·····-----··---····------------··········-----------------------17

CASES CITED
Bowden v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R., 3. U.2d 444,
286 P.2d 240 -----------······----------------------------------·-·····
..... 11
Gordon v. Provo, 15 U.2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 ............. 2, 17
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 ......... 14
Riley v. Layton, (CCA 10) 329 F.2d 53 (1964) ___________ 13
Universal Investment Company v. Carpets, Incorporated, 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 _____________ ....... 2. 15

TEXTS
53 Am. Jur., "Trial", Secs. 950-964 _____________ ... ... .

16

ANNOTATIONS
19 A.L.R.2d 1257 ---------------------------------- ------------·- ----········· 1€
98 A.L.R.2d 627 --------------------------------------------------------- ....... 16

lN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

?LORA PAULL,
Plaintijf and Appellant,
vs.
ZIONS FIRST NA TI ON AL BANK,
PAMELA B. SNOW, PHYLLIS R.
SNOW and MELVA B. SNOW, Administrators of the Estate of BURKE
M. SNOW, deceased,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.

10412

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
ST A TEMENT OF CASE
This is an action for physical impairment
claimed by plaintiff to result from care and treatment given by an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Burke M.
Snow.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Jury verdict returned and judgment entered in
favor of the defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks affirmation of the judgment
of the lower Court entered in his favor.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
On appeal the evidence and all reasonable in.
ferences that fairly may be drawn therefrom will be
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict
and the judgment entered thereon. Gordon v. Provo
15 U. 2d 287, 391 P. 2d 430; Universal Investment
Company v. Carpets, Incorporated, 16 U. 2d 336, 400
P. 2d 564. It is, therefore, necessary to supplement
the facts as stated by the appellant in order to set
forth facts favorable to the position of the respondents.
Plaintiff was troubled with pain in her right
shoulder commencing the latter part of June 1960.
(R. 100) She was first treated by Dr. Lenore Richards July 15, 1960. (R. 87, Ex. P-2) Dr. Pau:
Keller assumed treatment on July 29, 1960. (R. 202,
Ex. P-2) Dr. Keller advised plaintiff to keep the
shoulder moving; (R. 205) that it was important to
exercise in spite of the fact that it was painful; that
it was necessary to keep moving the shoulder because
lack of use of the shoulder results in loss of function.
( R. 202, 203) In addition to frequent injections of
xylocaine for pain, (R. 202) plaintiff was given pain
pills, anti-inflammatory pills and sedatives to decrease the pain so that she would persist and use the
shoulder more. ( R. 204) Each time the shoulder
was injected with xylocaine to relieve the pain, D:·
Keller manipulated her shoulder around to loosen. 1t
up. ( R. 204) Dr. Keller was concerned that the plam·
tiff was not exercising her arm. When he would ask
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her to move it, she was reluctant to do it and would
i10t do it very much. The only time she moved it
was after he injected it and then he pretty well manipulated it for her. ( R. 208)
On August 4, 1960, Dr. Keller noted that plaintiff's shoulder had become immobile from disuse.
(R. 203, Ex. P-2) It was apparent to him that because of the pain, plaintiff was not exercising the
shoulder as well as he thought she should be.
(R. 203) On August 5, 1960, Dr. Keller asked plaintiff to make an appointment with Dr. Snow, but she
actually did not go to see Dr. Snow until August 12.
(R. 204) Dr. Keller thought plaintiff was not exercising as much as was desired. He knew that in the
long run this would have a profound effect. Anyone
who has any ailment of the shoulder, if they don't
·Jse it, will end up with some lack of function of the
shoulder. (R. 205) The condition was unusual, certainly more complicated than usual and didn't respond to usual treatment. (R. 209) At the time of
trial Dr. Keller didn't think the plaintiff "uses any
of the deltoid" muscle very much and stated that it
could have been used if it had been exercised persistently all along. (R. 207)
When Dr. Snow first saw the plaintiff on
August 12, 1960, there was limitation of motion and
pain of movement of the shoulder. (R. 261) He
stressed motion to the plaintiff (R. 159, Ex. P-2)
and warned her that the shoulder might become
frozen. ( R. 104) Plaintiff cancelled appointments
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with Dr. Snow on September 6 and September 24
(R. 263, Ex. P-2) Dr. Snow could only move plain~
tiff's arm to a set limit. It seemed to meet a physical
block at that point and couldn't be raised even by
someone else physically trying to raise it. (R. 103)
Plaintiff was admitted to the L.D.S. Hospital
on September 29, 1960, and told by Dr. Hahn that
they would have to operate. (R. 95) Dr. Snow was
listed as attending physician on the hospital admission. (R. 167) The surgeon performing the surgery
was Dr. Hahn, the first assistant was Dr. Snow and
the second assistant was Dr. R. J. Toll. (R. 161) In
the course of the operation the surgeon is faced 1Vith
the decision as to whether to quit or continue. (R.
255) Dr. Snow, during the course of treatment prior
to surgery, did not think actual infection was present
notwithstanding change in color of fluid and injection of penicillin on September 3, 1960. (R. 173,
174) There was no concern regarding infection after
September 8, 1960. (R. 175) The plaintiff had no
fever on admission to the hospital. (R. 243) Had
plaintiff had a serious infection, it would have been
likely that she would have had a temperature. (R.
244) Laboratory report on culture of specimen of
fluid taken from bursal sac during course of surgery
was returned on the day following surgery. (R. 245)
This report indicated only that there was a presence
that could live in the human body and could cause
infection. ( R. 268) The report on the culture was
useful in prescribing post-operative medications. (R.
246)
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Dr. Toll, a practicing orthopedic surgeon (R.
236) in Tucson, Arizona, at the time of the trial,
IR. 237) testified that the procedures that were followed in the course of the operation conformed to
the standard of care followed by orthopedic surgeons
in this area. He stated that all procedures calculated
to protect the axillary or circumflex nerve of the
riO"ht deltoid muscle were followed. (R. 248)
l:>

After her release from the hospital, plaintiff
was follo\"ecl in the outpatient clinic at the hospital
(R. 250) rather than by Dr. Snow. (R. 199) The
clime arranged for physiotherapy. (R. 250) Plaintiff was asked to come to the outpatient clinic from
time to time. She came infrequently and would break
routine clinic appointments. (R. 250) Upon release
from the hospital plaintiff was told to return for
five or six weeks of therapy. ( R. 96) Therapy was
daily, Monday through Friday, except for her cancellations. ( R. 97) Plaintiff received twenty therapy treatments between the dates of October 21 and
November 25, 1960. (R. 235) The therapist did not
tell the plaintiff to discontinue coming. In his
opinion she would have continued to benefit with
respect to improved motion of her right arm had she
continued to come for therapy after November 25.
(R. 227) The plaintiff acknowledged that from the
time she started therapy until the last visit to the
therapist there was a trend of improvement and that
she was not told to discontinue therapy. (R. 117)
Dr. Toll testified that in the course of follow-up
they were satisfied that she was making slow but
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steady progress both in strength and range of motion
(R. 252) The therapist, Steve Hucko, testified tha.
at the time of plaintiff's first visit to therapy ther~
was active motion of the right arm. Plaintiff was at
that time able to move her shoulder without any sub.
stitution patterns in the forward, lateral and pos.
terior movements. ( R. 222) There was a gradual
process of improvement from the first time he saw
her. (R. 223)
Plaintiff saw Dr. Snow ten or twelve times
while she was in the hospital. ( R. 96) In December
1960 plaintiff saw Dr. Snow at the country club and
told him she was fine and showed him how she was
exercising her arm. ( R. 98) There is no evidence
that he examined her at that time. She made an appointment with Dr. Snow and showed him her shouider on February 21, 1961. (R. 107, 271)
Dr. Snow by deposition testified:
". . . Her post-op recovery was good ...
We had her get physical therapy, and the p~y
sical therapist was quite elated abo~t ~ne
progress she was making. She was begmnmg
to get her abduction back. The shoulder
seemed to be functioning better. She was.getting her strength back. And then she disappeared.... The next time I saw her why her
shoulder was as it is now .... As far as I
know, the deltoid muscle was functi?nin.g
well the anterior and lateral part which is
now' not functioning was working_ a~ that
time. So that in my own mind I've ehmmated
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any potential of having injured the muscle
in some way in surgery." (R. 270, 271)
Dr. Snow said that having participated in the surgery and seen the patient post-operatively he would
rule out surgical trauma as a cause of plaintiff's
condition. ( R. 179)
Following therapy and at the time of trial,
plaintiff's shoulder has greater movement than was
present prior to surgery. (R. 110, 111) The pain
in the hospital following surgery was considerably
less than prior to surgery and since leaving the hospital, she has not required any further medications
for pain. ( R. 112)
In the spring of 1961 plaintiff was asked by the
hospital's orthopedic staff to see Dr. Madison
Thomas, a neurologist, to test the nerve functions in
her right shoulder and to determine whether the
nerves were damaged. ( R. 108, 109) She refused to
submit to the test and has never done so. (R. 110)
Dr. Burton, an orthopedic surgeon practicing
in Boise, Idaho, ( R. 119) called on behalf of the
plaintiff testified that Dr. Snow was negligent in
two particulars :
(a) in completing the operation including the
removal of the tip of the acromion process in the
presence of infection observed when removing the
bursal sac for fear when you open the bone you will
develop a bone infection. (R. 131) He stated that this
did not cause plaintiff's condition; (R. 165) and
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(b). damaging the nerve supplying impulses to
the deltoid muscle some time during the surgical procedure. (R. 137, 138)
Dr. Burton further stated that the atrophv of
plaintiff's deltoid muscle took place as a result of
nerve injury, that this injury occurred during surgery (R. 136) and that this damage to the axillarv
nerve was the sole cause of her present conditio~.
(R. 148, 164) He acknowledged that muscle atrophy
could be caused by damage to nerve supply or disuse. ( R. 155) On further cross-examination he stated
that in the event of damage to the axillary nerve
in the course of the operation, you would expect immediate loss of nerve function. (R. 168) He was of
the opinion that the surgical procedure should have
been performed earlier. (R. 164) He didn't know
what was done by the doctors by way of deviating
from the standard of due care in the course of the
surgery, other than proceeding in the presence of
infection which did not cause plaintiff's condition.
(R. 164, 165) He stated that as long as improvement
continued post-operatively you would not discontinue
therapy. (R. 167) He acknowledged that in the absence of negligence in surgery scar tissue could develop within a muscle following surgery and impinge
upon and impair the nerve which impairment would
come on gradually and be permanent unless the scar
tissue were removed. (R. 157, 158)
Dr. Chester Powell, neurosurgeon, Salt Lake
City, testified that some trauma occurs in every
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operation. (R. 290) In the plaintiff's case the atrophy of the deltoid muscle was not associated with
evidence of main peripheral nerve damage, (R. 289)
an~, that in his opinion it was not possible that the
axillary nerve could have been damaged in the course
of the surgical procedure and produce this clinical
picture. ( R. 288)
On cross-examination by plaintiff's counsel Dr.
Paul Keller testified that a culture is not required
where one suspects infection, ( R. 208) and in answer
to question of plaintiff's counsel, objected to by counsel for defendants, he was permitted to say that he
wouid have continued the same course of treatment
as long as Dr. Snow did before putting plaintiff in
the hospital. (R. 210) He said that only after a long
course of conservative treatment would you consider
any operative procedure. (R. 211) To correct the
inference raised by plaintiff by the partial quote of
Dr. Snow on the subject of delay appearing on page
18 of Appellant's Brief, we set forth the full statement:

"I really don't know of any other way to
handle it. I think possibly you might say we
delayed too long in recommending surgery.
But these are extremely rare cases. As I say,
I haven't seen one for fifteen years like this.
And with the drugs that we have, why, they
usually will settle it down, and there isn't
surgery needed. This just kept going on and
on, and it wasn't until we knew for sure that
this thing wasn't going to settle down that
surgery seemed to me to be indicated. So I
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don't know of any other course that could b
taken. The only thing that I could see tha~
might be criticized in this treatment is oh
som~one might say it should have been don~
earlier, surgery might have been done earlier
But I don't think that anyone would. That
criticism has never been leveled at me r
don't know of any other way of handling lt."
( R. 265, 266)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT.
ING THE JURY ON THE MATTER OF CONTRJ.
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
There is ample evidence in the record and the
inferences to be reasonably drawn therefrom to support a finding that plaintiff was negligent in exercising care and concern for her own welfare and that
this negligence on her part was the cause of her
present condition.
Plaintiff was instructed by Dr. Snow to keep
her shoulder moving prior to surgery. (Ex. P-2, R.
104, 159) Plaintiff failed to retain the use and mo·
bility of her shoulder by adequate exercise during
treatment prior to surgery; ( R. 203, 205, 207, 208)
she failed to keep scheduled appointments with Dr.
Snow prior to surgery; ( R. 263, Ex. P-2) with the
physical therapist subsequent to surgery; (R. ~7\
and with the outpatient clinic of the L.D.S. Hospita
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after release from the hospital ( R. 250) ; she went
to the outpatient clinic of the hospital infrequently,
(R. 250) saw Dr. Snow only twice casually at the
country club after leaving the hospital and told him
only that she was fine. (R. 98) After admittedly
observing shoulder impairment in January 1961, the
plaintiff didn't bother to visit Dr. Snow at his office
until February 21. (R. 107, 271) When offered the
facilities of a neurologist for the purpose of testing
and evaluating nerve function of the shoulder in
April of 1961, (R. 108, 109) plaintiff refused and
has not since submitted to such tests. (R. 110) Plaintiff could have had the use of her right deltoid muscle
had she exercised persistently (R. 207) as per instructions. (R. 205, 159, Ex. P-2)
Considering the evidence, plaintiff's counsel belatedly offered an unnumbered requested instruction
on contributory negligence but withdrew it in view
of the instruction the Court proposed giving. ( R. 63)
The claimed error of referring to the deceased, Dr.
Snow, as the defendant in the Court's instruction No.
17 pointed out by the appellant is certainly not prejudicial so as to merit a reversal. As announced by
Justice Crockett, speaking for the Utah Court in
Bowden v. Denver and Rio Grande R.R., 3 U.2d 444,
286 P.2d 240:
". . . nor should a judgment be disturbed
merely because of error. Only when there is
error both substantial and prejudicial, and
when there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been different without it
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shoulc_l error be regarded as sufficient to u .
set a Judgment or grant a new trial."
p
POINT II
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING
TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT DR. BURKE
SNOW WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW.
Dr. Snow said that there was no concern regard.
ing infection after September 8, 1960, twenty-bro
days before surgery. (R. 175) Plaintiff had no fever
on admission to the hospital on September 29, 1960.
( R. 243) There is no evidence that Dr. Snow suspected the presence of infection at the time of commencing the operation. A culture taken cturing
surgery upon which a report was received a full day
after the operation ( R. 245) merely established the
presence of a bug which could cause infection. (R.
268) The fluid could be cloudy or purulent without
infection being present. ( R. 256) Plaintiff attempts
to equate "entertained the possibility of infection''
with "suspected the presence of infection". Obviously
infection in some form is always possible, but one
does not necessarily "suspect" the presence of that
which is "possibly" present. Having entertained t~e
possibility of infection the specimen of the flmd
taken during surgery was sent to the laboratory and
the subsequent report thereon was helpful. in pos.toperative treatment. (R. 246) The only ev1denc~ m
the record of any causal connection between p~ss1ble
infection and plaintiff's damages was the testimony
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of plaintiff's witness, Dr. Jerome K. Burton, to the
effect that operating in the presence of infection did
not cause plaintiff's damage. (R. 148, 164, 165)

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO GIVE PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION CONCERNING CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff relies upon the case of Riley v. Layton,
(CCA 10) 329 F.2d 53 (1964) as authority for his
claim that his offered instruction must have been
given to the jury. Plaintiff's requested instruction
was very similar to the one in question in the Riley
case. It must be remembered that the instruction ref erred to in the Riley case wa::; being considered by
reason of the objections raised by the appellant therein that the said instruction did not correctly state the
ia\v. The circuit court did not approve the instruction, but said :
"It may be conceded that the instructions
referred to are subject to some question when
considered separately and apart from the remainder of the charge. But in reviewing the
instructions given to a jury we must consider
them as a whole and not piecemeal. ... When
the instructions here are so considered we
think they gave the jury a correct understanding of the questions which it was to decide and
the pertinent principles of law to guide it in
that decision which is all that is required."
(Emphasis added)
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So in this case the jury was adequately instruc.
ted as to circumstantial evidence in the instructions
as a whole and particularly in instructions 3, 5 and
11. As suggested by the circuit court the plaintiff's
requested instruction is "subject to some question"
that it properly states the law in Utah. If in fact the
plaintiff's requested instruction on circumstantial
evidence were accepted as the standard of proof it
would completely alter the laws of evidence of negJi.
gence in malpractice cases in the State of Utah. See
Marsh v. Pemberton, IO U.2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, and
cases there cited.
POINT IV
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING
OF COUNSEL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE
JURY AS TO COUNSELS' OBJECTIONS TO
ALLOWING THE DEPOSITION OF DR. SNOW
TO BE TAKEN INTO THE JURY ROOM.

The court did not inquire as to plaintiff's objections, but merely asked counsel for both parties if
there were reasons why the jury should not be allowed to take the deposition saying that it was not
permissible unless both agreed. It must be noted
that neither counsel agreed and that both raised
negative comment although neither objected. In the
eyes of the jury neither party was put in an embarrassing position nor given an advantage. (R. 313,

314)
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The comment of Justice Crockett speaking for
the court in Universal Investment Company v. Carpets. Incorporated, 16 U.2d 336, 400 P.2d 564 would
seem to cover plaintiff's claim of error in this regard:
"It is neither unusual nor infrequent that

losing counsel is beset with fears that the
jurors have been led astray or have disregarded ~heir duty b~caus~ of som~ compa~a
tively mconsequential irregularity which
counsel may conjecture as the reason the
jury did not agree with him. But we believe
that such apprehensions are largely unjustified."
POINT V
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INQUIRING

OF THE JURY CONCERNING THEIR PERSONAL FEELINGS WITH RESPECT TO CONTINUED DELIBERATIONS.

The court without invading the jury's privacy
merely inquired of the jury as to their willingness
to deliberate longer and their feeling as to whether
further deliberation might be useful and constructive.
In doing so the court did no more than its duty
to see that the proceeding would result in a fair
determination of the matter if reasonably possible.
There was no attempt on the court's part to interfere
with the jury's determination, to inquire into their
position on the issues nor to coerce the jury. The
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jury was cautioned also that they could and should
stay with their principles. ( R. 324)
Abstinence from interference with or coercion
of the jury does not require the court to be inconsiderate. 53 Am.Jur., "Trial", Secs. 950-964; Annotation, 19 A.L.R.2d 1257.
POINT VI
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REQUIRING THE JURY TO CONTINUE DELIBERATIONS AFTER AN EXPRESSION FROM THEM.
"THEY WERE DEADLOCKED."
When the jury was sent to dinner it was told:
" ... when a majority of you tell your foreman that you just think it is useless, then
you come in and we will quit ... " (R. 244)
The record is void of any objections raised by
the plaintiff as to the length of time the jury
deliberated. Surely a party should not be permitted
to acquiesce in prolonged deliberations by a jury and
then first raise an objection when the results of those
deliberations prove to be adverse to that party's
interests. A fair reading of the authorities compels
one to observe that the trial court did not here abuse
its discretion nor coerce the jury. 53 Am. Jur.
"Trial" Secs. 950-964; Annotation 98 A.L.R.2d 627.
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CONCLUSION
"The purpose of a trial is to afford the parties a full and fair opportunity to present
their evidence and contentions and to have
the issues in dispute between them determined by a jury. When this objective has
been accomplished, and the trial court has
given its approval thereto by refusing to
grant a new trial, the judgment should be
looked upon with some degree of verity. The
presumption is in favor of its validity and
the burden is upon the appellant to show some
persuasive reason for upsetting it. Under the
cardinal and oft-repeated rule of review, we
will not disturb the jury's finding so long as
it is supported by substantial evidence, that
is, evidence which, together with the fair
inferences that may be drawn therefrom,
reasonable minds could conclude as the jury
did ; and we will not reverse the judgment
entered thereon unless in arriving at it substantial and prejudicial error was committed
in the sense that in its absence there is a reasonable likelihood that there would have been
a different result ... ."Gordon v. Provo City,
15 U.2d 287, 391 P.2d 430, 433
The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
R. M. CHILD
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
300 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Defendants and
Respondents

